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Abstract 
 
This paper compares the Protected Disclosures Act 2000 (PDA) in South Africa and New 
Zealand. The comparison is framed by the question whether the PDA binds members of 
Parliament (MPs) or not. Regarding South Africa, the paper analyses the provisions of the 
PDA and its curial interpretation in the Charlton litigation. Technically, MPs are bound by 
the PDA. This paper nonetheless defends the Labour Appeal Court’s merits judgment, which 
held that MPs are not bound. Regarding New Zealand, the paper analyses the provisions of 
the PDA and suggests the probable outcome in court if similar litigation were ever to occur 
in New Zealand.    
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I. Introduction 
 
This paper concerns the theory of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.1 
More narrowly put, the paper is about lawmakers and a particular law that they happened to 
make. It compares the Protected Disclosures Act 2000 (PDA) in both South Africa2 and New 
Zealand. The comparison is framed by the question whether the PDA binds members of 
Parliament (MPs) or not.  
 
The origin of this question began in South Africa with a trio of cases attracting some media 
and academic attention. Approximately a decade ago, Mr Charlton, the Chief Financial 
Officer of Parliament, made allegations about misconduct by some MPs in relation to their 
alleged misuse of travel benefits. Mr Charlton was dismissed after a disciplinary enquiry. He 
approached the Labour Court based on the claim that he had made disclosures which were 
protected under the PDA. Parliament raised several exceptions. The relevant one was that Mr 
Charlton had not made protected disclosures because MPs were neither the employer of nor 
the employees of Mr Charlton for the purposes of the PDA; accordingly, Mr Charlton had 
failed to disclose a cause of action. The Labour Court (LC) dismissed the exception.3 
Parliament appealed. The Labour Appeal Court (LAC) upheld the appeal.4 Mr Charlton, in 
turn, appealed. The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) upheld his appeal on a technical 
ground.5 Effectively, the law is now as stated by the LC. This paper nonetheless supports the 
LAC’s merits judgment and defends it against strong academic criticism. 
 
This paper is divided into three main parts. The first deals with parliamentary status. MPs are 
different from ordinary citizens because of the office they hold. This part briefly discusses the 
facets of parliamentary status as globally understood in parliaments across the world. The 
paper will then identify some definitional issues regarding MPs. How are they to be viewed 
by the public? How do you define their work portfolio?  
 
The second part deals with South African law and begins by setting out the country’s 
fundamental structure. It thereafter analyses the PDA and the Charlton cases. The paper also 
                                                          
1 Robert French AC, Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia “The Courts and the Parliament” (Queensland 
Supreme Court Seminar, Brisbane, Australia, 4 August 2012) at 12. 
2 Protected Disclosures Act, 2000 (Act No. 26 of 2000). 
3 Charlton v Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (C367/06) [2007] ZALC 47 (11 June 2007). 
4 Parliament of the Republic of South Africa v Charlton (CA2/08) [2010] ZALAC 13 (21 July 2010). 
5 Charlton v Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (680/2010) [2011] ZASCA 132 (16 September 2011). 
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discusses several cases relating to parliamentary conduct and the authority of the Speaker of 
the National Assembly. The relationship between the judiciary and the legislature has come 
to the fore in recent times. The LAC’s merits judgment is more relevant than ever. The paper 
then discusses academic criticism of the judgment and thereafter offers a rejoinder to this 
criticism.  
 
The third part deals with New Zealand law and begins by setting out its fundamental 
structure. The paper then analyses the PDA within the applicable legislative framework. The 
equivalent of the Charlton saga has not occurred in New Zealand. The paper briefly discusses 
the probable outcome in court if it were ever to happen.  
 
A. Parliamentary Status  
 
1. Globally Understood 
 
Marc van der Hulst’s The Parliamentary Mandate: A Global Comparative Study was 
published on behalf of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.6 One of its parts deals with 
parliamentary status. The author defines status as being about the “advantages and 
responsibilities designed to safeguard the free exercise of their mandate and protect them 
against pressures that might undermine their independence.”7 
 
Parliamentarians enjoy four different kinds of status. The first concerns salaries and 
allowances. This is integral to the status of MPs.8 South Africa has the Remuneration of 
Public Office Bearers Act 1998.9 New Zealand has the Members of Parliament 
(Remuneration and Services) Act 2013. 
 
The second concerns parliamentary incompatibilities, which are designed to guarantee of 
independence.10 This kind of status originates in the doctrine of separation of powers.11 There 
are different categories of incompatibility. The relevant category is that of incompatibility 
                                                          
6 Marc van der Hulst The Parliamentary Mandate: A Global Comparative Study (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 2000). 
7 At 27. 
8 At 28. 
9 Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act, 1998 (Act No. 20 of 1998). 
10 Hulst, above n 6, at 44. 
11 At 44. 
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with non-elective positions such as a civil service post.12 In South Africa, the Constitution 
states that “anyone who is appointed by, or is in the service of, the state and receives 
remuneration for that appointment or service” is ineligible to serve as a member of the 
National Assembly.13 In New Zealand, the Michael Connelly Appointment Validation Act 
1936, which is a private Act, provides a clear example of a similar incompatibility regime. 
Mr Connelly had been summoned to Legislative Council (now abolished) but was 
disqualified to serve as a member because he was a civil servant; section 2 of the Act 
validated his appointment and deemed him duly summoned. It is submitted that this is a rare 
exception. 
 
The third kind of status enjoyed by MPs is that of parliamentary immunity.14 MPs are 
representatives of the people and as such must be afforded various guarantees so as to 
underscore the “dignity, gravity and importance of their office”;15 they must also enjoy 
“peace of mind” in the discharge of their mandate.16 MPs enjoy parliamentary “non-
accountability” or privilege.17 This relates to freedom of speech.18 But they also enjoy 
parliamentary immunity, which concerns potential fear of the executive and includes 
protection against arrest.19 South Africa has the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of 
Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act 2004 (Privileges Act).20 New Zealand has the 
Parliamentary Privileges Act 2014. 
 
The last kind of status enjoyed by MPs is that relating to their rank in the hierarchy in 
Parliament.21 Generally, there is a principle of equal status of MPs; MPs elected on the basis 
of uniform principles laid down in electoral legislation.22 But there is still a pecking order. 
Parliaments across the global recognise precedence based on office and the primacy of the 
Speaker, which, in Britain, embodies the authority of the legislature.23 In countries following 
the parliamentary tradition the hierarchy proceeds as follows: 1. Speaker, 2. Deputy Speaker, 
                                                          
12 At 45. 
13 Constitution, s 47(1)(a). 
14 Hulst, above n 6, at 63. 
15 At 63. 
16 At 63. 
17 At 65. 
18 At 68. 
19 At 78. 
20 Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act, 2004 (Act No. 4 of 2004). 
21 Hulst, above n 6, at 94. 
22 At 94. 
23 At 95. 
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3. Leader of Majority, 4. Leader of Opposition, 5. Majority Whip, 6. Opposition Whip, 7. 
Ordinary members are ranked according to seniority.24  
 
This paper submits that any attempt to interpret parliamentary office must take into account 
the above hierarchy. Simply put, if MPs are interpreted to be “employees” for the purposes of 
the PDA, then this would bind the Speaker, as MP, in the same way as it would bind an 
ordinary MP. But the Speaker is meant to embody the authority of the legislature. Similarly, 
if an ordinary MP were interpreted to be an “employer”, then this would also undermine 
parliamentary hierarchy since an ordinary MP would be seen as an authority figure on the 
same level as the Speaker.   
 
2. Definitional Issues  
 
Parliamentary status makes the task of defining an MP’s role in society quite difficult. Where 
do MPs fit in? How should they be seen by the public? Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC argues that it 
is hard for an MP to know what task to focus on because there are so many that have to be 
carried out.25 There is no adequate “job definition” for an MP.26 In the main, MPs represent 
their electorates and the people in their constituency by presenting their grievances to 
Parliament.27 MPs have lots of material to read: Bills, government reports and reviews tabled 
in the House, select committee submissions, constituent correspondence, and paperwork in 
preparation for numerous meetings.28 Should MPs be viewed as people with a serious role in 
making law, scrutinising legislation, finding anomalies in Parliament, and contributing to the 
policy of the government of the day? Or should they be a “watchdog” for the people in 
respect of executive action? Or should they be “mindless servant[s]” of their political parties 
and vote as the party dictates?29 One issue facing MPs is how best to allocate tasks and 
manage their time.30 
 
Palmer notes that from an MP’s perspective, Parliament takes on a different “hue” from that 
seen by members of the ordinary public.31 From a lawyer’s perspective, the role of 
                                                          
24 At 96. 
25 Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC Reform: A Memoir (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2013) at 269. 
26 At 269. 
27 At 269. 
28 At 269. 
29 At 270. 
30 At 270. 
31 At 363. 
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Parliament is that of lawmaker and the interest lies in legislative clarity and coherence.32 The 
functions of Parliament are as follows: it raises money by which the business of government 
is conducted, it approves expenditure, it considers and passes laws, it provides a forum for the 
voicing of grievances, it holds the executive to account, and it provides a forum for parley or 
debate.33 These different perspectives on the role of Parliament also apply in South Africa 
despite its different fundamental structure. 
 
B. South Africa 
 
1. Fundamental Structure 
 
South Africa has a codified Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land.34 The 
doctrine of separation of powers is integral to the constitutional order; it concerns the 
distribution of power amongst the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary;35 the doctrine 
divides the functions of constitutional government between the branches best suited to 
exercise the relevant duties efficiently and effectively; the legislature is best equipped to 
make law, the executive to administer it, and the judiciary to interpret and apply it.36 The 
doctrine is not rigidly defined, nor is it absolute.37 The system of checks and balances forms 
part of the doctrine; the general purpose of checks and balances is to make the branches of 
constitutional government accountable to one another; checks ensures that the different 
branches control one another internally; balance concerns the counterweight to power 
possessed by each of the branches; the system of checks and balances can be seen as an 
audit.38 
 
The Constitution does not expressly provide for separation of powers but the doctrine is 
nonetheless an intrinsic part of constitutional democracy.39 Section 43 vests legislative 
authority in Parliament, section 85 vests executive authority in the President, and section 165 
                                                          
32 At 363. 
33 At 364. 
34 Constitution, s 2. 
35 Dikgang Moseneke, Deputy Chief Justice of South Africa “Separation of Powers: Have the Courts Crossed 
the Line?” (Inaugural Annual Law Dean‘s Distinguished Lecture, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, 
17 July 2015) at 5. 
36 At 6. 
37 At 6. 
38 At 7. 
39 At 8. 
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vests judicial authority in the courts. While separation of powers is not named in the 
Constitution, it is accepted as the “dominant organising principle of state power.”40  
 
Courts have refrained from trespassing into the terrain of another branch of government; they 
have recognised the need to defer to Parliament on occasion; this is particularly so in matters 
involving polycentric issues.41 The merits of disputed legislation fall outside the remit of a 
court.42 
 
The relationship between the branches of constitutional government is not designed to be 
competitive but rather symbiotic.43 However, this has not always been the case. In the 1950s 
South Africa came close to a constitutional crisis. The Union Parliament tried to remove 
coloured voters from the common voters roll. The Appellate Division invalidated the 
offending legislation.44 But Parliament purported to create a “High Court of Parliament” in 
order to override undesirable appellate decisions.45 The matter came before the Appellate 
Division again and it ruled that the “High Court of Parliament” was not a court but rather 
Parliament under another name.46 The crisis concerned the meaning of Parliament.   
 
This paper focuses on Parliament in the new constitutional dispensation. Terminologically, 
and in the national sphere, the Constitution refers to “Parliament”, “membership”, “National 
Assembly”, and members’ “privilege”.47 Parliamentary power is exercised collectively and 
individually. The power to initiate or prepare legislation is not an exclusively collective 
power exercised by the National Assembly.48 The making of decisions by way of majority 
vote is an exercise of collective power.49 But the power to initiate or prepare legislation can 
be exercised individually by MPs.50 Parliamentary privilege is enjoyed by Cabinet members, 
Deputy Ministers, and MPs.51 
 
                                                          
40 At 8 
41 At 9. 
42 At 9. 
43 At 15. 
44 At 15. 
45 At 16. 
46 At 16. 
47 Constitution, ss 42, 47, 49, 55, and 58. 
48 Oriani-Ambrosini, MP v Sisulu, MP, Speaker of the National Assembly (CCT 16/12) [2012] ZACC 27 (9 
October 2012) at [32]; Constitution, s 55(1)(b). 
49 At [37]; Constitution, s 53. 
50 At [40]; Constitution, ss 55(1)(b) and 73(2). 
51 Constitution, s 58(1). 
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2. Charlton Controversy  
 
Fifteen years ago Parliament enacted the PDA. But the legislation could have looked very 
different. As will be seen below, Parliament could have passed the Open Democracy Act 
instead. 
 
(a) Brief history of the Protected Disclosures Act 
 
The PDA began as the Open Democracy Bill 1998.52 This was a generic Bill. But Parliament 
chose to split this into two separate and discrete enactments, namely, the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act53 and the PDA.  
 
Legislative drafters are often faced with the generic-discrete or “magic bullet” dilemma.54 In 
the context of protected disclosures, the dilemma would be as follows: should there be a 
single, comprehensive, narrowly targeted discrete enactment, or, should the issue of protected 
disclosures be tacked onto generic legislation?55 Generic legislation has the effect of bringing 
the subject-matter of the legislation into the mainstream.56 Discrete legislation grants specific 
rights;57 it would also concomitantly impose specific duties. 
 
Parliament exercised a legislative choice in dropping the generic Open Democracy Bill and 
pursuing the enactment of discrete legislation instead. In the United Kingdom, the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which is discrete legislation, was inserted into the Employment 
Rights Act 1996, which is a generic statute. In contrast, South Africa pushed in the opposite 
direction; the legislature moved away from a generic Bill and toward discrete legislation. 
New Zealand’s PDA does not define “employer” since there is no demonstrable need to do so 
in the context of completely discrete legislation on protected disclosures. The UK defines 
“employer” because its law on public interest disclosures forms part of a generic statute. 
South Africa is stuck in the middle. While the Open Democracy Bill did not define 
“employer”, the legislature chose to define it in the PDA. In terms of legislative approach, 
                                                          
52 Open Democracy Bill B67 of 1998. 
53 Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of 2000). 
54 Rutherford Turnbull III “Rights for Developmentally Disabled Citizens: A Perspective for the 80s” (1981) 4 
UALR Law Journal 400 at 422. 
55 At 422.  
56 At 427. 
57 At 427. 
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South Africa has one foot in the UK by defining “employer” in the PDA and the other foot in 
New Zealand by enacting completely discrete legislation.  
 
Returning to the Charlton controversy, it is clear that the courts – the LC, the LAC, and the 
SCA – arrived at divergent views on the proper interpretation of the applicable legal 
framework. The question is whether this divergence is the result of judicial error in 
construing the framework or the framework itself.   
 
(b) The Protected Disclosures Act 
 
The PDA is set within the employment law context. This is clear from its long title, which 
describes the objective of an Act.58 The long title reads as follows: 
 
To make provision for procedures in terms of which employees in both the 
private and the public sector may disclose information regarding unlawful or 
irregular conduct by their employers or other employees in the employ of their 
employers; to provide for the protection of employees who make a disclosure 
which is protected in terms of this Act; and to provide for matters connected 
therewith. 
 
Notably, the Constitution specifically refers to “employees”, in the context of public service 
within the public administration, and “employers”, in the context of labour relations in the 
Bill of Rights.59 Regarding employees, the Public Service Commission has the power to 
investigate grievances of employees in the public service concerning official acts or 
omissions;60 the Commission also has the power to advise national and provincial organs of 
State on various aspects relating to the careers of employees in the public service;61 and the 
Constitution provides that public service employees are entitled to a fair pension as regulated 
by national legislation.62 Regarding employers, the Bill of Rights provides that employers 
have the right to form an organisation and participate in the activities and programmes of that 
                                                          
58 Bertie Van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for Safety and Security and Others (CCT 77/08) [2009] 
ZACC 11 (7 May 2009) at [43]. 
59 Constitution, ss 196 and 197 for “employees” and s 23 for “employers”. 
60 Constitution, s 196(4)(f)(ii). 
61 Constitution, s 196(4)(f)(iv). 
62 Constitution, s 197(2). 
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organisation;63 and every employer has the right to engage in collective bargaining.64 The 
Constitution does not define either “employee” or “employer”. 
 
This paper argues that these references are significant as they provide the only constitutional 
basis for the use of “employee” or “employer” in national legislation binding organs of state. 
The Constitution is the supreme law and any law inconsistent with it is invalid.65 Viewed 
from this perspective, there would be no constitutional basis on which to hold that MPs are 
either “employees” or “employers” for the purposes of the PDA. As stated further above, 
anyone employed in the service of the state is ineligible to serve as an MP and the 
Constitution’s references to “employees” occur in the context of the public service. 
Furthermore, the constitutional rights of employers to form an organisation and to engage in 
collective bargaining are provided for in the Labour Relations Act 1995 (LRA), which does 
not apply to MPs.66 Regarding MPs, this paper submits that the PDA’s references to 
“employee” and “employer” can only be interpreted in the sense specifically provided for in 
the Constitution.  
 
The preamble to the PDA also refers to “employees” and “employers” as well as phrases such 
as “conduct in the workplace”. It also recognises the horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights. The preamble further recognises that criminal and other irregular conduct on the part 
of organs of state is detrimental to transparent and accountable governance. It also states that 
the PDA was enacted in order to create a culture facilitating the disclosure of information 
relating to criminal or other irregular conduct in the workplace; this disclosure must take 
place in a responsible manner through the provision of “comprehensive statutory guidelines” 
for such disclosure.  
 
The PDA defines “employer”, “employee”, “disclosure”, and “protected disclosure”. 
Generally, it is not permissible to use the meaning attributed to words in other statutes as 
determinative in the interpretation of words used in a different statute.67 Statutory definitions 
                                                          
63 Constitution, s 23(3). 
64 Constitution, s 23(5). 
65 Constitution, s 2. 
66 Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995). 
67 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Thomas (CCT 168/14) [2015] ZACC 26 (25 August 2015) at 
[20]. 
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are taken to bear a special meaning and not an ordinary meaning.68 But the definition of a 
word in other statutes might be relevant if they “traverse the same terrain”.69  
 
One of the functions of a statutory definition is to limit the operation of the statute.70 While 
the extensive use of a word throughout an enactment may point to the need for a definition,71 
this cannot be seen as an absolute rule. What if the office of an MP straddles the definition of 
“employee” and “employer”?72 This paper reiterates that part of the interpretive difficulties 
experienced by the courts in the Charlton case arose in part because of the legislative choice 
to define “employer”. The PDA defines “employer” as follows:73 
 
(a) who employs or provides work for any other person and who remunerates 
or expressly or tacitly undertakes to remunerate that other person; or 
(b) who permits any other person in any manner to assist in the carrying on or 
conducting of his, her or its business,  
including any person acting on behalf of or on the authority of such employer. 
 
It is unclear as to why the legislature chose to define “employer” other than the fact that the 
word is used throughout the Act. But any interpretation of “employer” must be consistent 
with the Constitution’s reference to “employer”. It is submitted that the use of “employer” in 
the PDA must be understood in its constitutional sense, namely, as applying within the labour 
law context as regulated primarily by the LRA.  
 
The PDA’s definition of “employee” replicates the definition contained in earlier enactments, 
namely, the LRA and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 1997 (BCEA).74 The PDA 
defines “employee” as follows:75 
 
                                                          
68 At [20]. 
69 At [20]. 
70 My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT121/14) [2015] ZACC 31 (30 
September 2015) at [97]. 
71 At [100]. 
72 Adapting the reasoning at [108]. 
73 PDA, s 1. 
74 Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1997 (Act No. 75 of 1997). 
75 PDA, s 1. 
13 
Research Paper (LAWS 546) – Rethinking Parliamentary Status 
 
 
 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another 
person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any 
remuneration; 
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting 
the business of an employer. 
 
The PDA defines “disclosure” and “protected disclosure” separately. This paper only quotes 
the relevant subparagraph (a) of the definition of “disclosure”, which reads as follows:76 
 
[A]ny disclosure of information regarding any conduct of an employer, or an 
employee of that employer, made by any employee who has reason to believe 
that the information concerned shows or tends to show one or more of the 
following:  
(a) That a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is 
likely to be committed;  
 
The definition of “protected disclosure” sets out various categories of person to whom 
disclosures can be made. The definition reads as follows:77 
 
[A] disclosure made to- 
(a) a legal adviser in accordance with section 5; 
(b) an employer in accordance with section 6; 
(c) a member of Cabinet or of the Executive Council of a province in 
accordance with section 7; 
(d) a person or body in accordance with section 8; or 
(e) any other person or body in accordance with section 9, but does not 
include a disclosure- 
(i) in respect of which the employee concerned commits an offence 
by making that disclosure; or 
(ii) made by a legal adviser to whom the information concerned was 
disclosed in the course of obtaining legal advice in accordance 
with section 5. 
                                                          
76 PDA, s 1. 
77 PDA, s 1. 
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The PDA is clear that employees making protected disclosures must not be subjected to 
occupational detriment.78 The PDA provides such employees with various remedies in the 
event that they suffer occupational detriment.79 One remedy is to approach the Labour Court 
for appropriate relief.80 The PDA provides that dismissal in breach of the protection against 
occupational detriment is deemed to be automatically unfair dismissal for the purposes of the 
LRA.81 The PDA cross-references to that Act and its applicable provisions. This was the 
route followed by Mr Charlton. The PDA then goes on to provide for protected disclosures 
made to the various categories of persons or bodies referred to in the definition of “protected 
disclosure”.82 The PDA further provides for general protected disclosures.83 
 
The PDA provides that the Minister responsible for the administration of justice may make 
regulations; this power must be exercised after consultation with the Minister responsible for 
the public service and administration.84 Any regulations have to be submitted to Parliament 
before publication in the Government Gazette.85 The PDA further provides that the Minister 
must issue practical guidelines explaining the Act and the procedures available to employees 
desiring to make protected disclosures; this power must also be exercised after consultation 
with the Minister responsible for the public service and administration.86 Guidelines have 
been published but only in 2011.87  
 
(c) Labour Court 
 
As stated further above, Mr Charlton approached the LC claiming that he had made protected 
disclosures regarding the misuse of travel benefits and that his dismissal was automatically 
unfair, alternatively unfair. Parliament raised several exceptions but the relevant one is that 
the claimant had not made protected disclosures; in amplification of this point of law, 
Parliament excepted that MPs were neither the employer of nor the employee of the claimant.  
                                                          
78 PDA, s 3. 
79 PDA, s 4. 
80 PDA, s 4(1)(a). 
81 PDA, s 4(2)(a). 
82 PDA, ss 5 – 8.  
83 PDA, s 9. 
84 PDA, s 10(1). 
85 PDA, s 10(3). 
86 PDA, s 10(4)(a). 
87 “Practical guidelines for employees in terms of section 10(4)(a) of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000 (Act 
No. 26 of 2000)” (31 August 2011) 702 Government Gazette 34572. 
15 
Research Paper (LAWS 546) – Rethinking Parliamentary Status 
 
 
 
 
The LC held that the business of Parliament is not the same as that of “ordinary enterprise”; 
Parliament’s business is of its own kind and is defined in the Constitution.88 The LC was 
satisfied that Parliament’s business is to legislative for the Republic.89 The court held that 
MPs fall within the definition of “employees” for the purposes of the PDA; they perform 
their duties as organs of State.90 The court reiterated that MPs assist in the making of 
legislation and that the core business of the legislature is the enacting of legislation.91  
 
The court held that Parliament exists as a result of MPs and not the other way around.92 
Parliamentary staff work for MPs and if there were no MPs then there would be no work for 
the staff to do; effectively, MPs provide staff with work and permit staff to assist them with 
various tasks.93 The court also held that MPs did not have to formally employ or remunerate 
staff in order to be “employers”.94 It was not necessary to decide whether Parliament is a 
legal entity separate and distinct from its members because that question does not determine 
whether the PDA applies to MPs; further to this, neither the Constitution nor the Privileges 
Act expressly recognise Parliament as a separate entity.95 The court relied on the State 
Liability Act, which provides that parliamentary liabilities are to be paid out of the National 
Revenue Fund just like the salaries of MPs.96 The court held that there was no reason to 
exclude MPs from the definition of “employer” under the PDA; it was also unnecessary to 
refer to the LRA because the PDA and LRA were enacted for different purposes.97 The court 
viewed the arguments relating to parliamentary privilege as irrelevant.98 The court noted 
Parliament’s argument that MPs can act as whistle-blowers but not under the protection of the 
PDA.99 This argument was rejected.  
 
The LC held that MPs make laws and one particular law, the PDA, defines “employee” and 
“employer”; the PDA does not state in uncertain terms that MPs are not “employees” or 
                                                          
88 Charlton, above n 3, at [19]. 
89 At [21]. 
90 At [22]. 
91 At [23]. 
92 At [25]. 
93 At [26]. 
94 At [27].  
95 At [31]. 
96 At [33]. See State Liability Act, 1957 (Act No. 20 of 1957).  
97 At [34]. 
98 At [38]. 
99 At [41]. 
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“employers”.100 The LC then held that it does not make sense to argue that MPs enacted the 
PDA without intending it to apply to them; such an argument would make a “mockery” of the 
“whole legislation”.101 
 
The court also rejected the argument based on the SALC Discussion Paper, namely, that the 
Paper had discussed the possibility of “extending” the ambit of the PDA.102 The LC held that 
it was not bound by the Paper.103 The court then stated that the LRA, BCEA, and PDA have 
the same definition of “employee” but only the PDA defines “employer”.104 
 
The LC then recapped by stating that it had already found that MPs fall within the definition 
of “employer” and that they also have the characteristics of an “employee”.105 The LC 
dismissed the exceptions.106 
 
(d) Labour Appeal Court 
 
Parliament appealed to the LAC. The court framed the terms of its evaluation of the case as 
follows:107 
 
This case raises a novel issue as to whether parliamentarians are ‘employees’ 
or ‘employers’ as defined by the PDA. The outcome of this case will not only 
have an impact on the parties involved, but it will also affect the public. This 
court is mindful of the doctrine of separation of powers, which holds that the 
judiciary’s function is to interpret the law and apply it even if the conclusion 
may lead to reprehensible conduct escaping scrutiny. Ultimately, this case 
hinges on statutory interpretation. In essence, this court must decide whether 
or not the application of ‘employer’ or ‘employee’ as defined in the PDA 
should be extended so as to include MPs. 
 
                                                          
100 At [43]. 
101 At [45]. 
102 At [47]. 
103 At [47]. 
104 At [50]. 
105 At [70]. 
106 At [74]. 
107 Charlton (LAC), above n 4, at [23]. 
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It is clear from the above quote that the court viewed the case as unprecedented. The court 
understood the fundamental importance of separation of powers in the sense that its 
application may result in “reprehensible conduct escaping scrutiny”. This is important. As an 
appellate court, the LAC had to be mindful of the broader constitutional effect of its judgment 
on the relationship between the legislature and the judiciary; it is arguable that the dominant 
organising principle of separation of powers can trump even the legitimate and pressing 
concerns of the aggrieved litigant. The LAC also stated that the outcome of the case hinged 
on statutory interpretation. The LAC then characterised the issue in terms that reflect a desire 
not to be seen to be rewriting the statute; this characterisation presents the case as being about 
whether a judge should extend the application of a statutory definition; in other words, and 
put in starker terms, the LAC asked whether the judiciary should step into the shoes of the 
legislature. It will be argued further below that this approach is consistent with the LAC’s 
recognition of the fundamental importance of separation of powers under which Parliament 
makes law and courts interpret and apply it.  
 
The LAC then referred to the presumption that the State is not bound by statute. The LAC 
noted that the court below had held that it would not make sense if MPs “made a law that 
does not or was not intended to apply to them” as this would “make a mockery to the whole 
legislation.”108 It is submitted that the LAC’s reference to the presumption was a direct 
response to the LC’s reasoning that MPs could not have enacted a statute that did not apply to 
them. It might make sense under certain circumstances for an organ of State not to be bound 
by statute. In pointing this out, the LAC was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction over the 
LC. Furthermore, the PDA does not contain the widely used provision: “This Act binds the 
State.” The Constitution does not define “the state” but does define an “organ of State”.109 
The PDA’s omission of this common provision may provide a further reason for the LAC’s 
reference to the presumption.  
 
The LAC held that the presumption would have to be developed in line with the new 
constitutional order premised on governmental accountability and transparency.110 The court 
then held as follows:111  
 
                                                          
108 At [24]. 
109 My Vote Counts, above n 70, at [103]. 
110 Charlton (LAC), above n 4, at [25]. 
111 At [25]. 
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To hold that the provisions of the PDA bind MPs would hamper the execution 
of their duties and functions. In any event Parliament has its own mechanism 
to deal with MPs whose conduct fails to pass muster.  
 
This quote provides textual evidence that the LAC was of the view that the presumption had 
not been rebutted. It is crucial to remember that the case concerned a novel issue implicating 
separation of powers. Under the Constitution, Parliament has the right to control its own 
internal arrangements. 
 
The LAC then turned to the question whether lawmakers are “employees” for the purposes of 
the PDA. The court held as follows:112  
 
To subject MPs to the PDA may, in practice, run the risk of frustrating the 
democratic process. An extension of the application of ‘employee’ under the 
PDA to include MPs might cause statutes to become more complex. MPs 
ought to be entirely independent. 
 
Further to the above, the court noted that MPs hold an office; they are elected and have no 
recourse to Labour Court if they lose their seat; they take an oath of obedience to the 
Constitution; they have a statutory right to remuneration; and they enjoy privileges that do 
not extend to ordinary citizens.113 
 
The court then agreed with Parliament’s argument that the use of the same definition of 
“employee” in the LRA and the PDA strongly indicated the intention to create a single 
statutory scheme. The BCEA also has the same definition of “employee”. The court then 
relied on the House of Lords decision in Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Co114 
as authority for its view. The LAC held as follows:115 
 
[The Barras principle holds that] where a word of doubtful meaning has 
received a clear judicial interpretation, the subsequent statute, which 
incorporates the same word in a similar context, must be interpreted according 
                                                          
112 At [27]. 
113 At [28] 
114 Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Co [1933] UKHL 3 (17 March 1933). 
115 Charlton (LAC), above n 4, at [29]. 
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to the meaning that was previously given to it. This occurs where the 
Legislature has repeated the word without alteration. This principle is 
applicable to the present case. Both the LRA and the PDA are firmly set 
within the employment law context. The PDA primarily concerns disclosures 
made within an employment relationship. MPs are excluded from the 
provisions of the LRA and therefore are also excluded from the PDA. 
 
The LAC found that an even stronger indication of the creation of a single statutory scheme is 
the fact that section 187(1)(h) of the LRA, which deals with automatically unfair dismissal, 
specifically refers to the PDA; MPs are excluded from the LRA and therefore they are also 
excluded from the PDA.116 Incidentally, the LRA contains the provision: “This Act binds the 
State.”117 
 
The court then addressed the question whether lawmakers are “employers” for the purposes 
of the PDA. The court held that parliamentary staff are answerable to Secretary of 
Parliament.118 The LAC held as follows:119  
 
Parliamentarians must be allowed to focus on their constitutional duty to make 
law. A MPs portfolio ought not to be cluttered with the additional and onerous 
responsibilities of being an ‘employer’ of parliamentary staff. This would 
hinder the effective performance of their duties and functions. 
 
The LAC upheld the appeal.120 But this was not the end of the matter. By way of legal 
artifice, the Supreme Court of Appeal ensured that the law is that contained in the LC’s 
judgment.  
 
(e) Supreme Court of Appeal 
 
Mr Charlton appealed to the SCA.121 The SCA upheld the appeal by relying on the general 
rule that the dismissal of an exception is not appealable.122 The SCA substituted the LAC’s 
                                                          
116 At [31]. 
117 LRA, s 209. 
118 Charlton (LAC), above n 4, at [33]. 
119 At [33]. 
120 At [38]. 
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order with one striking the appeal from the roll.123 Technically, the LC’s judgment is now 
law since the appeal against it was struck from the roll. This paper argues that something 
closer to the LAC’s judgment ought to be the law. 
 
(f) Post-Charlton parliamentary cases 
 
Over the past few years there have been several cases brought before court concerning 
unparliamentary conduct and the Office of the Speaker.124 These cases demonstrate the 
increasingly frequent interaction between the courts and Parliament. This is an unwelcome 
development.  
 
The High Court interdicted the Speaker from implementing or enforcing the National 
Assembly’s decision to suspend some opposition MPs’ membership without remuneration or 
a fine in Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and 
Others.125 During August 2014 the applicants had asked the President questions in Parliament 
regarding repayment of public money spent on his residence. The applicants found his 
answers to be insufficient.126 Much disorderly conduct ensued; security was called in; the 
business of the House was suspended; there was much banging on tables and chanting of 
“pay back the money”.127 Allegations of gross disorder were referred to the Powers and 
Privileges Committee for investigation.128 There were counter-allegations that ANC members 
had also disrupted the business of Parliament but had not been dealt with in the same way.129 
The court referred to the principle of parity of treatment despite the fact that it fell “within the 
context of labour law admittedly”.130 The court was nonetheless of the view that a similar 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
121 Charlton v Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (680/2010) [2011] ZASCA 132 (16 September 2011). 
122 At [18]. 
123 At [25]. 
124 Lekota and Another v Speaker, National Assembly and Another (14641/12) [2012] ZAWCHC 385 (11 
December 2012); Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 
(21471/2014) [2014] ZAWCHC 204 (23 December 2014); Malema and Another v Chairman of the National 
Council of Provinces and Another (12189/2014) [2015] ZAWCHC 39 (15 April 2015); Democratic Alliance v 
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (2792/2015) [2015] ZAWCHC 60 (12 May 2015); Tlouamma and 
Others v Mbethe, Speaker of the National Assembly of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another (A 3236/15) [2015] ZAWCHC 140 (7 October 2015). 
125 Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (21471/2014) 
[2014] ZAWCHC 204 (23 December 2014) at 1. 
126 At 8 – 12. 
127 At 12. 
128 At 13. 
129 At 39. 
130 At 39. 
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principle would be applicable to the applicants.131 The court also held that the applicants 
were not “aggrieved employees” but were public representatives paid to represent their 
constituents.132  
 
This paper submits that the EFF case highlights the dangers of viewing MPs in ordinary 
employment law terms. This is particularly so in the context of MPs attempting to hold the 
President to account for what they perceived to be corruption on his part. On the one hand, 
the court said that something similar to the parity principle ought to apply to MPs. On the 
other hand, the court expressly said that the MPs were not “aggrieved employees” but were 
rather public representatives. Similar difficulties would arguably arise if MPs were held to be 
employees or employers or both within the special meaning of those terms in the PDA.    
 
The High Court upheld a constitutional challenge against the Privileges Act in Democratic 
Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others.133 There had been major disruptions 
during a joint sitting of Parliament convened for the President’s State of Nation address. The 
Speaker invoked the Privileges Act by calling in parliamentary staff and “security forces” in 
order to forcefully remove the members belonging to the EFF.134 The applicant challenged 
the constitutionality of section 11 of the Privileges Act, which purported to authorise the 
Speaker and Chairperson to do so.135 The court held that the impugned section applied to 
“members”. The court also held that the section is overbroad in that it permits MPs to be 
arrested for what they said on the floor of the House.136 Furthermore, Parliament had 
sufficient tools to maintain order; it had rules as well as the power to hold members in 
contempt.137 The court declared the section inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.138 
This paper submits that MPs enjoy robust parliamentary privileges and, accordingly, there is 
no need to consider them “employees” for the purposes of the PDA. MPs are adequately 
protected against any occupational detriment by their status as office-bearers. 
 
                                                          
131 At 40. 
132 At 45. 
133 Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (2792/2015) [2015] ZAWCHC 60 (12 
May 2015). 
134 At [1]. 
135 At [2]. 
136 At [43]. 
137 At [44]. 
138 At [48]. This declaration still has to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court; Constitution, s 172(2)(a). 
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The latest case dealing with parliamentary matters and, more specifically, the nature of the 
Office of the Speaker is Tlouamma and Others v Mbethe, Speaker of the National Assembly 
of the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa and Another.139 The case concerned a 
“three-pronged application” brought by three minority opposition parties. This paper will 
only focus on the claim for the Speaker to be removed from office. The Speaker had 
allegedly failed to act in a neutral and fair manner; it was also alleged that the Speaker was no 
longer fit and proper to hold office.140 The matter concerned a motion of no confidence in the 
President, which was eventually scheduled for debate on 3 March 2015. On this day one of 
the applicants requested, first, that the Speaker recuse herself as presiding officer and, 
second, that the vote on the motion take place by secret ballot. These requests were 
refused.141 The Speaker opposed all the relief sought.142 This paper focuses on those aspects 
of the judgment that concern the nature of the Office of the Speaker. 
 
The court extensively discussed the applicable constitutional and legislative framework with 
particular emphasis on the doctrine of separation of powers.143 The court held that the 
Speaker’s “powers, functions and duties are traditional and ceremonial, statutory, procedural 
and administrative”.144 The court also held that “[t]he Speaker has final authority in enforcing 
and interpreting the rules of the National Assembly.”145 The Speaker also performs the 
“vital” function of maintaining order in the National Assembly.146 The court then held that 
“[w]hile members of Parliament represent their individual constituencies, the Speaker 
represents the full authority of the House itself.”147 And further that “[b]y common consent 
the Speaker’s judgment is normally unquestioned and the Speaker is looked upon as the 
guardian of parliamentary democracy.”148 The court noted that there are no provisions in the 
Constitution that specifically provide for the role and powers of the Speaker.149 But the 
                                                          
139 Tlouamma and Others v Mbethe, Speaker of the National Assembly of the Parliament of the Republic of 
South Africa and Another (A 3236/15) [2015] ZAWCHC 140 (7 October 2015). 
140 At [1]. 
141 At [2]. 
142 At [6]. 
143 At [59] – [74]. 
144 At [75]. 
145 At [76]. 
146 At [77]. 
147 At [78]. 
148 At [78]. 
149 At [82]. 
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Speaker is the “administrative leader” of the National Assembly and as such is duty bound to 
uphold its dignity and authority.150 The application was dismissed. 
 
The years since the SCA’s judgment in Charlton have seen an alarming increase in the 
number of cases involving office-bearers in Parliament. These controversies pose serious 
constitutional questions about the status of MPs as well as the role of the Speaker. Despite the 
SCA’s legal artifice in resolving the Charlton cases, this paper submits that the LC and LAC 
judgments are more relevant than ever before.  
 
3. Academic Criticism 
 
The LAC’s judgment on the merits has come under some severe academic criticism. In 
particular, this paper refers to Craig Bosch and Professor Rochelle Le Roux’s article entitled 
Not Letting Them Whistle: The Labour Appeal Court’s Approach to the Protected 
Disclosures Act and Protecting Parliament’s Employees.151 The learned authors state that the 
decision is “haphazard” and the reasoning is “unconvincing”.152 Furthermore, the court’s 
characterisation of the issue is “not entirely correct”; the LAC had to determine whether 
Charlton’s claims were disclosures for the purposes of the PDA; part of this issue relates to 
the question whether MPs are “employees” or “employers” for the purposes of the PDA; the 
LAC was therefore not required to decide whether the PDA ought to apply to MPs; this 
misplaced emphasis caused the LAC to make various errors in the course of its reasoning.153  
 
The learned authors then dealt with the LAC’s reference to the presumption that the State is 
not bound by statute. The authors stated that the LAC made no finding whether the 
presumption still has a place in a constitutional democracy; the LAC also did not clarify the 
effect of the presumption on its reasoning; despite accepting that the presumption ought to be 
developed in line with the new constitutional dispensation, the LAC then went on to reason 
that MPs would be obstructed in the performance of their duties if employees could make 
disclosures relating to misconduct.154 The authors criticised the “startling conclusion” drawn 
by the court; it also “beggar’s belief” to conclude that MPs could be hindered by the 
                                                          
150 At [82]. 
151 Craig Bosch and Rochelle Le Roux “Not Letting Them Whistle: The Labour Appeal Court’s Approach to the 
Protected Disclosures Act and Protecting Parliament’s Employees” (2011) Obiter 591. 
152 At 594. 
153 At 594.  
154 At 595. 
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disclosure of unlawful conduct; it was also unclear as to precisely what additional obligations 
the PDA would place on MPs and the authors suggested that there would be none.155 
Furthermore, the LAC did not provide any further explanation on the mechanisms that 
Parliament would use in order to deal with errant MPs.156 The LAC’s judgment was further 
criticised on the basis that it did not consider whether the presumption had been rebutted.157 
There were clear indications that the State ought to be bound by the PDA; these indications 
are to be found in the PDA and public policy.158 
 
The authors then criticised the LAC’s resolution of the question whether MPs are employees 
for the purposes of the PDA. The authors argued that the LAC’s reasoning was “puzzling” 
and lacked any substantiation; it was difficult to understand how the application of the PDA 
to an MP’s misconduct would frustrate the democratic process; the contrary is true.159 The 
authors further argued that the LAC’s view regarding the complexity of legislation was 
“incomprehensible”; the court ought to have provided clear reasons for its “startling 
findings”.160  
 
The authors conceded that MPs are not employees in the conventional sense and the usual 
hallmarks of the employment relationship are missing.161 However, the authors argued that 
MPs could be seen to be employees within the special meaning contained in the definition of 
“employee” for the purposes of the PDA and not the LRA. This is so because the context and 
purpose of the two enactments are different.162 The LAC’s reasoning that there is a single 
statutory scheme between the LRA and the PDA is valid on its face but apparently disregards 
the different legislative origins of the two Acts.163 The authors noted that the Acts are 
administered by different state departments.164 
 
                                                          
155 At 595. 
156 At 595. 
157 At 596. 
158 At 596. 
159 At 598. 
160 At 598. 
161 At 598. 
162 At 599. 
163 At 599. 
164 At 599. 
25 
Research Paper (LAWS 546) – Rethinking Parliamentary Status 
 
 
 
The authors also criticised the LAC’s unitary conception of employment contracts, namely, 
that all types of employment are the same.165 This approach cannot accommodate the diverse 
types of employment that exist in a modern economy.166 
 
The authors concluded that MPs are probably not employees. This is so because their office is 
incompatible with that of non-elective positions in the civil service in terms of section 47 of 
the Constitution as well as the fact that MPs have a statutory right to remuneration, amongst 
other reasons.167 
 
The authors then moved to the question whether MPs are employers for the purposes of the 
PDA. The authors answered this in the positive but not before offering further critical 
assessment of the LAC’s decision. The authors argued that that the LAC’s remarks about the 
cluttering of an MP’s portfolio are “speculative” and not supported by any evidence.168  
 
The authors conceded that part (b) of the definition of “employer” is “slightly ambiguous” 
but nonetheless concluded that a broader interpretation is required so as to include MPs 
within its ambit.169 The authors argued that the LAC fatally omitted the objects of 
transparency and accountability in interpreting the PDA.170 The authors also relied on 
fundamental rights such as the right to fair labour practices, freedom of expression, access to 
information, and dignity.171 The authors also criticised the “serious omission” on the part of 
the LAC in that the court omitted to mention the relevant international instruments.172 
 
In sum, the authors concluded that the LAC had failed to demonstrate its specialist status in 
labour law. The court had also failed to provide proper guidelines as supervisor of the 
development of labour relations policy and case law.173 
 
One solution has been suggested by Smith and Botha in their article entitled Is the Protected 
Disclosures Act applicable to MPs?174 The authors claim that the best option is to amend the 
                                                          
165 At 600. 
166 At 600. 
167 At 601. 
168 At 602. 
169 At 603. 
170 At 603. 
171 At 604 – 609.  
172 At 609. 
173 At 612. 
26 
Research Paper (LAWS 546) – Rethinking Parliamentary Status 
 
 
 
PDA.175 The amendment would list MPs in the definition of “employee” so that they are 
deemed to be employees for the purposes of the PDA.176 
 
4. Rejoinder and Defence  
 
The academic criticism above totally overlooks the doctrine of separation of powers. The 
Charlton case raised a novel issue. Courts approach such cases from first principles.177 
Charlton directly implicated the constitutional relationship between the judiciary and the 
legislature; a court had to determine whether national legislation applied to lawmakers; it is 
submitted that separation of powers comes to the fore in such cases.  
 
It is further submitted that separation of powers influenced the LAC’s characterisation of the 
issue. The court was concerned not to judicially extend the statutory definition. It is argued 
that while the primary question was whether Mr Charlton had made protected disclosures, the 
doctrine of separation of powers was foremost in the LAC’s mind. It is further argued that the 
LAC was justified in focusing on the effect that its judgment would have on Parliament in 
general and MPs in particular. The more constitutionally relevant question was whether MPs 
were to be considered as employees or employers for the purposes of the PDA. This is 
particularly so given the specific references to these words in the Constitution. 
 
The learned authors are also selective in their reliance on constitutional provisions. 
Proportionality is the hallmark feature of the Constitution.178 The authors make no attempt to 
view transparency and accountability in proportion to parliamentary rights. These rights 
would include the National Assembly’s right to determine and control its internal 
arrangements, proceedings and procedures,179 and privilege rights.180 Ironically, MPs must 
enjoy parliamentary non-accountability in order to hold the executive accountable.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
174 Smith and Botha “Is the PDA applicable to MPs?” (2011) 4 TSAR 815.  
175 At 828. 
176 At 829. 
177 Roux v Hattingh (636/11) [2012] ZASCA132 (27 September 2012) at [42].  
178 Company Secretary of Arcelormittal South Africa v Vaal Environmental Justice Alliance (69/2014) [2014] 
ZASCA 184 (26 November 2014) at [73]. 
179 Constitution, s 57. 
180 Privileges Act; see also Constitution, s 58(2). 
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As discussed further above, the learned authors argued that the LAC’s reasoning that there is 
a single statutory scheme between the LRA and the PDA apparently disregards the different 
legislative origins of the two Acts. But this argument can be rebutted by reliance on Arse v 
Minister of Home Affairs181 regarding the formation of one statutory system. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal held as follows:182 
 
In so far as there may be a conflict between the two provisions they should be 
reconciled. Where two enactments are not repugnant to each other, they 
should be construed as forming one system and as re-enforcing one another. 
In Petz Products v Commercial Electrical Contractors it was said:  
 
‘Where different Acts of Parliament deal with the same or kindred 
subject-matter, they should, in a case of uncertainty or ambiguity, be 
construed in a manner so as to be consonant and inter-dependant, and the 
content of the one statutory provision may shed light upon the 
uncertainties of the other.’ 
 
Both the LRA and the PDA are set within the employment law context. The Acts are not 
repugnant to each other. Rather, they reinforce each other. Both Acts cross-reference the 
other. The LRA was enacted before the PDA. And the PDA replicates the definition of 
“employee” contained in the LRA. The PDA began as the generic Open Democracy Bill and 
was subsequently split into two separate Acts.  
 
Further to the above, it is submitted that there is nothing constitutionally significant in the 
fact that the LRA and the PDA are administered by different state departments. This is 
because of the fluid nature of state departments which often change after a new government 
is formed. Pursuant to the 2014 general elections, the President published a proclamation 
transferring the administration and powers and functions of specified legislation to various 
Cabinet members.183 The Cabinet members are executive authorities for the various 
departments. Notably, the administration of one piece of legislation was transferred from the 
Minister of Home Affairs to the Minister of Communications; another piece of legislation 
                                                          
181 Arse v Minister of Home Affairs (25/10) [2010] ZASCA 9 (12 March 2010). 
182 At [19] footnote omitted. 
183 “Transfer of administration and powers and functions entrusted by legislation to certain Cabinet members in 
terms of section 97 of the Constitution” (15 July 2014) 47 Government Gazette 37839. 
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was transferred from the Minister for the Public Service and Administration to the Minister of 
Telecommunications and Postal Services.184 The President even created a new ministry, the 
Minister of Small Business Development, and transferred legislation from the Minister of 
Trade and Industry to this new Minister.185 It is clear that the argument that the LRA and the 
PDA are administered by different state departments is a makeweight argument at best. The 
President may in the future decide to reconstitute the ministries and transfer the 
administration of legislation accordingly.  
 
This paper concludes that the LAC’s merits judgment was the result of defects in the 
legislative framework rather than judicial error. The LAC was correct to hold that the PDA 
does not apply to MPs. It is not for the courts to debate the merits of legislation.  
 
C. New Zealand 
 
1. Fundamental Structure 
 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC’s recent book entitled Reform: A Memoir describes New Zealand’s 
“Constitution” as being “unique” and “odd”.186 Palmer also notes that New Zealand does not 
have a “Constitution” in the same sense as America187 or South Africa. Palmer states as 
follows:188  
 
The Parliament passes laws, levies taxes and controls government 
expenditure. Elections are required to be held every three years and they are 
held under a system of mixed-member proportional representation (MMP). 
The Cabinet, the members of whom must be members of Parliament, governs. 
Members of Cabinet must maintain the confidence of Parliament in order to 
remain in office. The public service operates under the authority of ministers 
and must carry out their decisions. The courts operate independently of both 
Parliament and the executive branch of government, which consists of Cabinet 
and the public service. Parliament creates the law and the courts decide 
                                                          
184 At 4 and 5 respectively. 
185 At 8. 
186 Palmer Reform, above n 25, at 337. 
187 At 338. 
188 At 339 footnote omitted. 
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disputes according to these statutes, but the role of interpreting the law in any 
particular case falls to the courts, not to Parliament. If the result is not to 
Parliament’s liking, it can amend the law. The judiciary is shielded by law 
from interference by ministers. The judiciary is the main protector of the 
important constitutional norm of the rule of law. Clearly, public power is not 
distributed evenly among these three branches of government. Parliament has 
most power. 
 
The Constitution Act 1986 provides that the House of Representatives is always in existence 
notwithstanding dissolution or expiration of Parliament.189 The members of the House consist 
of those persons elected from time to time in accordance with the Electoral Act; these 
members are to be known as Members of Parliament.190 MPs are required to take an oath of 
allegiance.191 The Speaker is elected by the House192 and continues in office notwithstanding 
dissolution or expiration of the Parliament.193 Parliament consists of the Sovereign in right of 
New Zealand and the House.194  
 
2. Legislative Framework 
 
The impetus for the PDA was a matter involving a nurse, Mr Pugmire, who had warned 
hospital management against the release of a psychiatric patient into the community. The 
patient was nonetheless released and was subsequently found to have committed sexual 
offences against children.195 In Pugmire v Good Health Wanganui Ltd (No 2)196 the facts 
were that Mr Pugmire had released confidential patient material to an MP in an attempt to 
blow the whistle on wrongdoing within the hospital. The applicant had been compelled to 
accept either demotion or dismissal for breaching patient confidentiality. He applied for 
urgent interim relief declaring that this compulsion frustrated his legitimate expectation of 
natural justice as well as his expectation that his grievance procedure would be resolved first, 
                                                          
189 Constitution Act, s 10(3). 
190 Constitution Act, s 10(4). 
191 Constitution Act, s 11. 
192 Constitution Act, s 12. 
193 Constitution Act, s 13. 
194 Constitution Act, s 14(1). 
195 David McGee “Ombudsmen and officers of Parliament - Ombudsmen – whistleblowing” (online ed., Te Ara, 
Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, updated 13 July 2012). 
196 Pugmire v Good Health Wanganui Ltd (No 2) (WEC 6/94) BC199471183 (10 March 1994). 
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amongst other relief. Although the application was granted, the case highlighted the lack of 
protection for employees making such disclosures in the public interest.  
 
Some years later Parliament enacted the PDA. The purpose of the Act is to promote the 
public interest by facilitating the disclosure and investigation of serious wrongdoing and 
protecting employees who make such disclosures.197 A disclosure can be made to an 
“appropriate authority” but the PDA expressly excludes a Minister of the Crown and an MP 
from the definition of this phrase.198 This is the only part of the PDA that expressly refers to 
MPs. The PDA defines “employee” as follows:199  
 
employee, in relation to an organisation, includes— 
(a) a former employee: 
(b) a homeworker within the meaning of section 5 of the Employment 
Relations Act 2000: 
(c) a person seconded to the organisation: 
(d) an individual who is engaged or contracted under a contract for services to 
do work for the organisation: 
(e) a person concerned in the management of the organisation (including a 
person who is a member of the board or governing body of the 
organisation): 
(f) in relation to the New Zealand Defence Force, a member of the Armed 
Forces: 
(g) a person who works for the organisation as a volunteer without reward or 
expectation of reward for that work 
 
The PDA also defines an “organisation” and “public sector organisation”. An “organisation” 
means the following:200 
 
organisation means a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporate, 
and whether in the public sector or in the private sector; and includes a body 
of persons comprising 1 employer and 1 or more employees 
                                                          
197 PDA (NZ), s 5. 
198 PDA (NZ), s 3(1) “appropriate authority”, para (d). 
199 PDA (NZ), s 3(1). 
200 PDA (NZ), s 3. 
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The definition of “organisation” refers to the public sector and the legislature chose to 
specifically define “public sector organisation”; the relevant part of “public sector 
organisation” means the Office of the Clerk of the House and the Parliamentary Service, 
amongst other organisations.201 The specific definition of “public sector organisation” trumps 
the more general definition of “organisation”. Moreover, the latter definition refers to 
“employer” and “employees” indicating conventional employment relations governed by 
ordinary labour law. This paper reiterates the difficulties identified by Sir Geoffrey Palmer 
QC in trying to define an MP’s role in society; as stated further above, there is no adequate 
definition for an MP’s portfolio. And Parliament wisely elected not to attempt to define an 
MP’s office in discrete legislation such as the PDA. 
 
Further to the above, the threshold set by the PDA is that of “serious wrongdoing”; one type 
of wrongdoing concerns “an unlawful, corrupt, or irregular use of funds or resources of a 
public sector organization”.202 What if MPs were found to have used parliamentary travel 
funds in a corrupt manner?   
 
The PDA sets out the type of disclosures to which the Act applies. The interpretation section 
contains the phrase “protected disclosure of information”, which cross-references to section 
6(2) of the PDA. 203 Section 6(1) and (2) of the PDA read as follows: 
 
6 Disclosures to which Act applies 
(1) An employee of an organisation may disclose information in accordance 
with this Act if— 
(a) the information is about serious wrongdoing in or by that organisation; 
and 
(b) the employee believes on reasonable grounds that the information is 
true or likely to be true; and 
(c) the employee wishes to disclose the information so that the serious 
wrongdoing can be investigated; and 
(d) the employee wishes the disclosure to be protected. 
                                                          
201 PDA (NZ), s 3 “public sector organisation”, paras (d) and (e) respectively. 
202 PDA (NZ), s 3 “serious wrongdoing”, para (a). 
203 PDA (NZ), s 3. 
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(2) Any disclosure made in accordance with subsection (1) is a protected 
disclosure of information for the purposes of this Act. 
 
 
The PDA is clear that the serious wrongdoing must have occurred in an organisation or have 
been committed by that organisation. And it is arguable that MPs do not fall within the 
definition of either “organisation” or “public sector organisation”. Therefore, it is further 
submitted, the PDA does not bind MPs at all. They are neither an appropriate authority to 
whom disclosures can be made nor are they legally liable for serious wrongdoing.  
  
The PDA must be understood in the context of other statutes relating to Parliament. The first 
is the Clerk of the House of Representatives Act 1988. There is a hierarchy in Parliament: the 
Clerk, the Deputy Clerk, and the acting Clerk.204 The Clerk of the House is established as an 
office;205 the Clerk is the principal officer206 and is responsible to the Speaker for the 
efficient, effective and economic management of the office.207 The Act also deals with the 
State Services Commissioner in relation to the office;208 the Commissioner is the nominal 
employer of the Clerk but must exercise his or her functions consistently with the office’s 
role and its separation from executive government.209 
 
The next statute is the Parliamentary Services Act 2000. The General Manager is the 
administrative head of the service210 and is responsible to the Speaker.211 The Service 
provides administrative and support services to the House and MPs;212 and, with the 
Speaker’s approval, the Service may also provide services to the following: any officer of the 
House, any officer of Parliament, any office of Parliament, and any department or other 
instrument of the Crown.213 The State Services Commissioners plays the same role as the one 
relating to the Clerk of the House.214 
 
                                                          
204 Clerk of the House Act, ss 2, 4, and 6 respectively. 
205 Clerk of the House Act, s 14. 
206 Clerk of the House Act, s 15 
207 Clerk of the House Act, s 16. 
208 Clerk of the House Act, s 17. 
209 Clerk of the House Act, s 17(1A). 
210 Parliamentary Service Act, s 10. 
211 Parliamentary Service Act, s 11. 
212 Parliamentary Service Act, s 7(a). 
213 Parliamentary Service Act, s 9(1)(a) – (d) respectively. 
214 Parliamentary Service Act, item 15(1A) of schedule 1. 
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The next chronological statute is the Members of Parliament (Remuneration and Services) 
Act 2013. This Act provides for the remuneration of MPs by the Remuneration Authority.215 
It is cited in support of the proposition that MPs are not “employees” for the purposes of the 
PDA. This is so because they hold an office and have a statutory right to remuneration, which 
is set by an authority rather than an employer in the conventional sense.  
 
MPs enjoy privileged status under the Parliamentary Privileges Act 2014. The main purpose 
of the Act is to “reaffirm and clarify the nature, scope, and extent of the privileges, 
immunities, and powers exercisable by the House of Representatives, its committees, and its 
members”.216 The other main purpose is to adequately protect MPs from exposure to civil 
and criminal liability for “communication of, and of documents relating to, proceedings in 
Parliament.”217 A subsidiary purpose is to alter the law relating to “proceedings in 
Parliament” by way of legislative reversal of Attorney-General v Leigh.218 The Act goes 
further and specifically implicates the doctrine of separation of powers; the Act must be 
interpreted in a manner that “the principle of comity” between the courts and Parliament.219 
 
3. Probable Outcome in Court 
 
To date, the issue as to whether the PDA binds MPs has not come before the courts. The PDA 
has been referred to in several decisions but none of them involve protected disclosures made 
against MPs for any serious wrongdoing.220 
 
Significantly, the PDA defines “employee” but not “employer”. This paper submits that MPs 
are not employees as defined. They hold an office and have a statutory right to remuneration. 
The job of a civil servant employed within the state service is incompatible with the office of 
an MP. Furthermore, MPs would not need the benefit of the PDA since they can rely on their 
privileges in disclosing any serious wrongdoing.  
 
                                                          
215 Remuneration Act, s 8. 
216 Privileges Act, s 3(1)(a). 
217 Privileges Act, s 3(1)(b). 
218 Attorney-General v Leigh [2011] NZSC 106 (SC). 
219 Privileges Act, s 4(1)(b). 
220 See Timmins v Legal Aid Review Panel [2004] 1 NZLR 708 (HC); Reeves v OneWorld Challenge LLC (CA 
87/04) [2005] NZCA 314 (8 December 2005); Solicitor-General v Miss Alice [2007] 2 NZLR 783 (HC); Jeffries 
v Privacy Commissioner (SC5/2010) [2010] NZSC 99 (12 August 2010). 
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If the Charlton controversy were ever to occur in New Zealand, this paper argues that the 
courts would have an easier task of interpreting and applying the legislative framework than 
the LAC in South Africa. Although the primary question in New Zealand would be whether a 
protected disclosure had been made, the PDA is clear that the serious wrongdoing must have 
occurred in an organisation or have been committed by that organisation. MPs are not 
included in the definition of “organisation” or “public sector organisation”. The PDA does 
not bind MPs at all. They are neither an appropriate authority to whom disclosures can be 
made nor are they legally liable for serious wrongdoing. The current structure of the PDA 
does not allow for a finding that MPs are bound by its contents. The courts are bound by law 
and would probably interpret the legislative framework so as to exclude MPs from its ambit.  
 
II. Conclusion 
 
This paper concerned the theory of the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature. 
It concerned the question whether lawmakers in South Africa and New Zealand are bound by 
a particular law they happened to make, namely, the PDA. Technically, in South Africa, MPs 
are bound since the LC’s judgment in the Charlton case now stands as law. This paper 
nonetheless sought to defend the LAC’s merits judgment against strong academic criticism. It 
was argued that the judgment was the result of defects in the legislative framework rather 
than judicial error. The paper also argued that if similar litigation were to occur in New 
Zealand, then it is probable that the courts would not bind MPs to the PDA.  
 
This paper took three steps to arrive at the above conclusions. First, it dealt with 
parliamentary status as globally understood in parliaments across the world. The paper also 
identified some definitional issues regarding MPs and their role in society. Second, the paper 
dealt with South African law by setting out its fundamental structure and analysing the PDA 
as well as the Charlton cases. This part also defended the LAC’s merits judgment. Third, the 
paper dealt with New Zealand law by setting out its fundamental structure and analysing the 
applicable legislative framework.  
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